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ARGUMENT
I.

This Court should reverse the District Court's decision because the totality of the
evidence, construed in the light most favorable to H20, shows that at the outset of the
Payroll Contract, Proimtu purposefully availed itself to conducting business in the
state of Idaho.
The District Court's decision should be reversed because it was based on the incorrect

conclusion that the performance of the Payroll Contract in Idaho was the result ofH20's unilateral
acts.

In reaching this conclusion, the District Court failed to consider the totality of the

circumstances and failed to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to H20. In Proimtu's
opposition brief, it invites this Court to repeat those errors. For the reasons that follow, this Court
should reject such invitation and hold that due process allows an Idaho court to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over Proimtu for its failure to reimburse H20 for money advanced to pay
Proimtu' s taxes under a Payroll Contract that Proimtu knew would be performed in Idaho.

A. H20's performance of the Payroll Contract in Idaho was not a unilateral act
because, prior to the commencement of the Payroll Contract, Proimtu knew that
H20 would administer the Payroll Contract in Boise and that Proimtu's payroll
would be distributed through a Boise bank branch.
This Court can and should reject Proimtu' s argument and authority that the unilateral acts
of H20 caused the Payroll Contract to be performed in Boise because the evidence, construed in
the light most favorable to H20 establishes that Proimtu knew, prior to entering into the Payroll
Contract, that it would be performed in Boise. In S. Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe &
Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977), this Court made clear that once an out of state
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Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154,

90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)) is satisfied. Proimtu has failed to address this authority.
The facts presented in this case, when construed in the light most favorable to H20, show
that Promimtu was aware that the Payroll Contract would be performed in Idaho and, further, that
Proimtu would be availing itself to the protections of the laws of the state ofldaho because Proimtu
was using Idaho banks to carry out the terms of the Payroll Contract. After it learned that payroll
would be administered from Boise (which was prior to commencement of the Payroll Contract),
Proimtu could have elected to use a different payroll administrator. Similarly, when Proimtu
learned that payments for performance of the Payroll Contract would be distributed through a
Boise bank branch (which, again, was prior to the commencement of the Payroll Contract),
Proimtu could have asked that H20 use a bank located elsewhere. Proimtu did neither of these
things. Knowing that the Payroll Contract would be administered in Boise and knowing that the
payments for performance of the Payroll Contract would be distributed through a Boise bank
branch, Proimtu knowingly agreed to those terms and started performing under the Payroll
Contract by purposefully availing itself to Idaho's banking system. Contrary to the authority upon
which Proimtu relies, this was not a unilateral act undertaken by H20 after the Payroll Contract
commenced. Accordingly, Proimtu's "unilateral act" argument can and should be rejected by this
Court.
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Court to consider the various acts establishing jurisdiction in isolation, rather than in their totality.
Respondent Answer Brief, p. 11. However, when Proimtu's contacts with Idaho are considered in
their totality, and construed in the light most favorable to H20, the evidence establishes that
Proimtu has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Idaho to satisfy the requirements of
specific jurisdiction.
Specifically, H20 presented three evidentiary bases that combine to demonstrate Proirntu
had sufficient minimum contacts with the state. First, H20 showed the trial court that the signature
line on Mr. Savre's email showed a Boise address. R. Vol. I, p. 36, ,1, p. 47-50. The trial court
erred when it refused to construe this fact in favor ofH20 and, instead, found that such a signature
line might not necessarily have given Proimtu notice or knowledge of Mr. Savre's physical
location. Second, H20 put on evidence that Proimtu knew the Payroll Contract was performed in
Boise because prior to commencement of the Payroll Contract, Proimptu received a W-9 with a
Boise address, and notice that H20 would be using a Boise bank branch to process payroll. R.
Vol. 1, p. 36, ,1, p. 37, ,12, p. 47-50, p. 51-53. Again, the trial court erred when it refused to
construe this fact in favor of H20 and, instead, focused on the work performed in Tonapah under
a different contract. The Payroll Contract at issue in this lawsuit was performed in Idaho and that
fact cannot be changed by the fact of performance of a different contract outside of Idaho. Third,
and finally, H20 presented evidence that Proimtu, on a weekly basis, mailed payroll information
and funds to be processed by H20 and distributed through the Boise bank. R. Vol. I, p. 37,12,
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Contract, R. Vol. 1, p. 36, 17, p. 37, 112, p. 47-50, p. 51-53, entered into the Payroll Contract in
November 2012, R. Vol. 1, p. 36, 14, and began the Payroll Contract in December 2012, R. Vol.
1, p. 37, 114. Proimtu knew well in advance how and where the Payroll Contract would be
administered and went forward. Accordingly, the "unilateral act" argument fails.
These three acts should not be considered separately. Rather, they should be considered
together, as part of the totality of the circumstances that give rise to Proimtu's purposeful availment
of itself to Idaho. Moreover, these facts should be construed in the light most favorable to H20
and the trial court's failure to do so is error. Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024,
1026 (2005) (citing Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 978, 98081 (1990)) (explaining that the court must "construe the evidence presented to the district court in
favor of the party opposing the order and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might
be reasonably drawn."). When all of the evidence is weighed at once and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in favor ofH20, it is clear that Proimtu knew the work under the Payroll Contract was
being performed in Idaho and that it was purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting
business in Idaho, including using Idaho's banking system to distribute payroll funds to its
employee.
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should
Proimtu's argument and authority that mere knowledge
location is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction because the
evidence shows that Proimtu engaged in specific activity-sending money to Idaho
and relying on an Idaho bank branch to distribute its payroll-that constitutes
purposeful availment to the state.

Proimtu relies on myriad cases that hold, "the defendant's awareness of the location of the
plaintiff is not, on its own, enough to create personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Respondent
Answer Brief, p. 11-12. However, as discussed in H20's opening brief and above, H20 does not
rely solely on Proimtu' s awareness of H20' s physical location in making any of its jurisdictional
arguments.
Instead, H20 relies on Proimtu's weekly sending of payroll information and money to
Idaho, combined with Proimtu's continuous and systematic use of an Idaho based bank to
distribute payroll to its Tonapah employees. The affirmative acts of entering into a contract with
a company located in Idaho to process payroll (including its federal Davis-Bacon reporting),
sending money to an Idaho bank to fund said payroll, and using an Idaho bank to distribute said
payroll constitutes, "some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of
business within the forum state." Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008).
Based on these facts, Proimtu purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in
Idaho and it is appropriate for Proimtu to be hailed into Idaho for a lawsuit relating to that Payroll
Contract.
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specific personal jurisdiction over Proimtu under the circumstances
this case comport
traditional notions fair play and substantial
Proimtu has failed to respond to H20's arguments and authority showing that exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction over Proimtu in this case comports with traditional notions of fair
piay and substantial justice. Instead, Proimtu attempts to circumvent the second prong of the
analysis by relying on the case of Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558
F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977), and arguing that exercising jurisdiction over a defendant would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice where the "contracts at issue here were not
to be performed in any part" within the forum state and thus have "no substantial connection" to
the forum state. Respondent Answer Brief, p. 16.
To make this argument Proimtu misrepresents the facts by focusing this Court's attention
on Proimtu's contract to provide construction services in Nevada, rather than the at-issue Payroll
Contract. Specifically, Proimtu incorrectly claims that, "this lawsuit involves a dispute ...
involving the salaries of Nevada construction workers . . ." and that place of contractual
performance was Nevada. Respondent Answer Brief, p. 16-17. That is simply not the case. This
lawsuit involves Proimtu's failure to reimburse H20 for taxes H20 advanced on Proimtu's behalf
while administering the Payroll Contract-a contract that was fully performed in Idaho. Proimtu
continues this misdirection by misrepresenting that the substance of the Payroll Contract was to
obtain Nevada workers. Respondent Answer Brief, p. 16. However, the record shows that H20's
role was to conduct pre-employment screening of potential employees that Proimtu had selected,
and that screening was conducted in Boise. R. Vol. 1, p. 37, ,r10. This Court should not be
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III.

The District Court's decision to deny attorney fees and costs was proper because
Proimtu failed to meet its burden of providing the District Court with the information
necessary for it to make such an award.
Proimtu's argument for reversing the trial court's decision to disallow Proimtu's request for

costs fails to address the District Court's reasoning for disallowing such costs: namely, that the
Statement of Costs submitted by Proimtu failed to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54
and was, therefore, insufficient to allow any trial judge to make the proper assessment under
I.R.C.P. 54. Proimtu's entire argument is directed at the mandatory nature of the fee award in this
case, but fails to address the fact that Proimtu did not provide the trial court with adequate
information for it to make such an award.
Rule 54(d)(4) requires that a Statement of Costs itemizes each claimed expense. Proimtu's
Statement of Costs included no itemization of any expense or costs but instead requested only
attorney fees. R. Vol. 1, p. 160-168. In requesting attorney fees, the Statement of Costs lists time
keepers John F. Daniels, Chris Byrd, Emily Ward, Brenoch Wirthlin, and Jessica Gale. Id. It does
not, however, indicate whether these individuals are attorneys or paralegals, nor does it indicate
the extent of their experience, education and ability. Id. Proimtu failed to provide the District
Court with any information regarding the prevailing charges for like work or whether the requested
rates were based on reasonable rates in the local market. Id. Finally, Proimtu did not present any
arguments or evidence regarding the various factors set forth under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A-L).
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a reasonable and appropriate amount for an award
of attorney fees, the Court must consider the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(c)(3).
Those factors include the "time and labor required," I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A); the
"novelty and difficulty of the questions," I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(B); and the "prevailing
charges for like work,"' I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(D). "[I]t is incumbent on the party
seeking attorney foes to provide sufficient information for the court to consider
[these] factors." Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261,264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct.
App. 1985). A Rule 54(d)( 5) memorandum of costs and a Rule 54(c)( 5) affidavit
are "necessary for application of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors." Medical Recovery
Services. Med. Recovery Servs., LLC, v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 110, 175 P.3d 795
(Ct. App. 2007). 175 P.3d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 2007). Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5),
a claim for attorney fees as costs "shall be supported by an affidavit of the attorney
stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney fees claimed." In this
case Defendant has provided a Statement or Costs which indicates hours worked
and amounts charged by various individuals. However, there is no information
regarding, for example, whether these individuals are attorneys or paralegals, their
experience and ability, and the prevailing charges for like work. As the Court is
without sufficient information to consider the factors set forth in 54(e )(3 ), Plaintiffs
motion to disallow Defendant's request for costs is granted.
R. Vol. 1, p. 248-249.
Proimtu ignores these issues entirely. It instead focuses its briefing on the mandatory
nature of the fee request, ignoring the actual holding of the trial court. The District Court's
decision to grant H20' s motion to disallow Proimtu' s fee request must be upheld because Proimtu
failed to meet its burden of providing the District Court with the information necessary for it to
make an award.

CONCLUSION
Since the totality of the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to H20,
demonstrates that Proimtu continuously and systematically sent information to be processed in
Idaho and funds to be distributed through an Idaho bank, H20 has met its burden of demonstrating
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courts.

the

performed in Idaho using an Idaho bank prior to entering into the Payroll Contract. The trial
court's decision to dismiss this case for want of personal jurisdiction must be reversed.
Finally, Proimtu failed to provide the trial court with the information necessary to make an
award of fees. Accordingly, the order disallowing Proimtu's request for fees should be sustained.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of December, 2016.
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON

By
Vau
Fisher
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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